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Blacklisting defines social and political relations between designators and designees.1 In 
the realm of international security, the United States Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list is 
a salient blacklist. As one of the centerpieces of U.S. counterterrorism policy,2 the FTO list 
proscribes groups as terrorist organizations which threaten the United States. The FTO list comes 
with legal, political, and economic consequences. Designated organizations face financial and 
travel restrictions. Financial sanctions include freezing of assets by the Treasury Department.3 
Travel restrictions include no entry into the United States or deportation for individuals 
associated with the group, which could be especially detrimental to groups that lobby in the 
United States to procure funds.  
As a global performance indicator (GPI) that defines who is terrorist group and who is 
not, the FTO list has political consequences in global security. Who is affected by the terrorist 
list and what are the associated political processes? Using the framework of GPIs as outlined in 
Chapter 1 by Kelley and Simmons, this chapter examines how FTO designation affects the 
behavior of listed groups. We argue and demonstrate that the impact of FTO listing depends on 
the characteristics of listed terrorist groups. Groups with private funding sources, such as 
diaspora population, are vulnerable to stigmatization and sanctions from the FTO list. By 
contrast, groups with less observable funding sources, such as terrorist networks, are unaffected 
by listing and may even increase attacks. Our finding generates a general lesson: understanding 
differences between targets is essential to evaluating the impact of GPIs.4  
The FTO list could reduce terrorism by generating political responses from relevant 
political actors. The list is determined by the U.S. State Department and serves as a guide for the 
U.S. bureaucracy, other countries’ listing, and counterterrorism actions taken by the United 
Nations. The blacklist triggers international cooperation, especially from ally countries of the 
United States, and creates fear of being branded as terrorists among vulnerable populations like 
diaspora or humanitarian communities. In this way, blacklisting affects the reputations of listed 
groups, essentially naming and shaming them. In addition to such social sanctions, blacklisting 
exposes listed groups and their supporters to political and financial sanctions, particularly when 
the countries hosting terrorist organizations employ such domestic measures. Consequently, 
terrorist groups that rely on political and material support from those who are subject to scrutiny 
by the blacklist will be affected by the FTO list. Groups with less public sources of support will 
be relatively less impacted by the force of blacklist.  
We test our predictions about the conditional impact of the FTO list using new data on 
terrorist group funding sources. We find that designation is only associated with reductions in 
attacks of terrorist groups that depend on private funding. This highly conditional finding 
suggests that GPIs have a limited impact in this example of global security. We also provide case 
evidence that some terrorist groups alter their financing strategies after designation. By 
																																								 																				
1 Social science research in political science, psychology, sociology, and criminology, all emphasize the 
importance of labels. See for example, Feldman 1977; Link et al. 1989; Becker 1997; Bernburg et al. 
2006; and Paternoster and Bachman 2012. 
2 The Bureau of Counterterrorism within the State Department reports “FTO designations play a critical 
role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities 
and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.” See U.S. State Department, Bureau of 
Counterterrorism “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm  
3 For example, $13.5 million in cash flow to al-Qaeda was blocked as of 2013 in the wake of FTO 
designation of the group in 1999 (Treasury Department 2014). 
4 Also see Chapter 7 by Koliev et al. in this volume. 
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restricting private support, for example, listing may lead terrorist groups to rely more on criminal 
activities. In this fashion, blacklisting has a potential to produce unintended consequences in the 
long-run.5  
We start this chapter with background on the FTO list and the designation process, and 
then explain why blacklisting is only likely to affect groups that depend on private funding 
sources. Empirical tests on terrorist groups between 1970 and 2014 provide some evidence that 
the FTO blacklist had some intended effects of reducing terrorist groups’ attacks, but only under 
limited scope conditions. Case study evidence then illustrates potential unintended consequences 
as some terrorist organizations shifted their resource base in response to the blacklisting and 
regulatory pressure. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for scholarship and policy.  
 
FTO blacklisting in global security  
 
Relative to other issue areas such as human rights, business, environment, or education, 
global security has few GPIs.6 The dearth of security indicators may be due to the nature of high 
politics where countries refrain from provoking others, or the security risks associated with the 
information. For instance, policymakers were concerned that the issuance of Nuclear Threat 
Initiative (NTI)’s Sabotage Index might be used by terrorists to exploit the vulnerability of 
countries that are weak on nuclear security.7  
The FTO list is clearly a Global Performance Indicator (GPI) where an “assessment” 
exercise creates an “indicator.” The list is a regularized policy “assessment” based on the 
performance and status of violent non-state actors across a common set of criteria, namely their 
use of terrorism and threats to U.S. national security. The list has been updated almost annually 
since 1997, adding several groups each year, making 67 groups total on the list at the beginning 
of 2019.8 The assessments of foreign terrorist organization essentially produces binary indicator 
that brands some groups as terrorists but others not. The designation then becomes public as the 
list is announced by the federal registrar and delivered to Congress through State Department 
public release. Although the list currently includes a disproportionate number of Middle Eastern 
groups, it has always contained groups from around the world, giving the indicator global 
coverage.  
Blacklisting is essential to the FTO process as the list labels some non-state actors as 
dangerous deviants. FTO designation creates a stark distinction, leading to GPI dynamics that are 
different from other rankings, ratings and benchmarks. This branding usually comes from more 
powerful, established actors with more authority and social acceptance. Blacklisting clearly 
marks the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. The FTO case thus 
embodies authority relationships in world politics where powerful actors create structure and 
weaker actors operate within that structure. Published by the United States as the power wielder 
and indicator creator, the FTO list helps define unacceptable political violence vis-à-vis the 
																																								 																				
5 See further Chapter 11 by Lee and Matanock and Chapter 12 by Bisbee et al. in this volume.  
6 Examples include the sabotage/threat ranking (Nuclear Threat Initiative), PowerIndex (Bonn 
International Center), European Foreign Policy Scorecard (European Council on Foreign Relations), 
Global Peace Index (Vision of Humanity), and PowerIndex (Global Fire Power). 
7 We owe Matt Fuhrmann on this point. 
8 GAO 2015. See Murphy 2003 for general background of FTO listing. Also see Cronin et al. 2004; 
Cronin 2003. The current list is available here: https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm 
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superpower.9 Such framing alters the security policies of other states as well as international 
organizations, including the United Nations and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).10   
By making what was previously unofficially legitimate as officially illegitimate, the 
blacklist’s reframing also configures the perceptions and actions of support networks of a target. 
It changes the political, legal, and social landscapes for national governments, international 
organizations, and beyond. This enabling power of blacklisting is activated when the target is hit 
by the erosion of its political support, ultimately impacting its operations and possibly survival. 
Blacklisting in the context of FTO designation undermines some terrorist groups’ financial base 
and that in turn will influence their capacity to undertake violence. FTO listing will not always 
achieve its intended effect, however. Some terrorist groups adapt to new regulatory frameworks 
by shifting their resource base. 
 
Contestation and listing politics 
 
The famous adage “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” encapsulates 
potential contestation surrounding the validity of the FTO list.11 Designation of terrorist 
organizations is a debated issue in policy circles. Cronin sums up this contestation over the FTO 
list: “there are hundreds of groups that meet the criteria for the Foreign Terrorist Organization 
(FTO) list but do not get added.”12 To be listed as FTO, a militant group must be a foreign 
organization that engages in terrorist activity13 and threatens U.S. national security.14 Threat 
perception is always subject to debate, as are national security interests.  
Who is listed and who is not,15 whether the process of listing meets statutory 
requirements,16 and whether listing has human rights implications17 are all controversial.18  
																																								 																				
9 Other examples of blacklists, in association with U.S. counter-terrorism policy, such as State Sponsors 
of Terrorism, or Specially Designated Global Terrorist List, would have similar political dynamics we 
highlight with respect to the FTO blacklist. 
10 The designation of terrorist groups by other countries closely follows the U.S. list, although differences 
exist given security circumstances of each country. See the discussion in Freeman 2012. Also, the United 
Nations sanctions dates closely follow the actions of the U.S. Treasury. See the dates in Treasury 2016. 
On the FATF, see Chapter 3 by Morse in this volume. 
11 See Jarvis and Legrand 2018 and its associated special issue on what they call “proscription regimes.” 
12 Cronin 2012. 
13 U.S. Code § 2656 f (d) (2) defines terrorist activity as “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetuated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” While there is no 
universal definition of terrorism, studies on political violence define terrorism as political acts to invoke 
physical or psychological pain on civilians. Terrorist organizations are groups that exercise terrorist acts 
and prescribe to terrorism. The terrorist label is not a neutral term, but carries negative connotations about 
social exclusion and unacceptable behavior.  
14 Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) as amended under 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) (P.L. 104-132) 
15 Just a few examples: see discussion on Haqqani network in Afghanistan (Cronin 2011), weighing on 
Muslim Brotherhood FTO designation (Baker 2017), or controversy over the delisting of the Communist 
Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) in Gagalac 2017.  
16 See United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, No. 12-1118 (MEK v. State 
Department, 2012). 
17 Head 2016. 
18 See Crenshaw and LaFree 2017; Phillips 2015. 
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Proponents of designation want to increase military attacks, declare a group illegitimate, and to 
ward off its supporters. Those who are against designation of a certain group raise concerns over 
the human rights and humanitarian implications of the listing.19  
Cross-national differences between terrorist lists reveal the presence of contestation. 
Some overlap exists between the U.S. list and those of Australia, Canada, the EU and the UN, 
but there is little overlap with India’s and Russia’s lists.20 The fact that there is substantial 
overlap with most of the lists suggests the U.S. list is influential, and that the FTO list, like other 
GPI instruments, alters other political actors’ responses and labeling. 
Besides listing itself, the efficacy of FTO list is also disputed. In an interview with the 
Washington Post, a White House official said that the designation is “all theatrics,” and merely 
“symbolic.”21 Others describe it as a “meaningless political tool”22 or playing only a “modest 
role”23 in counter-terrorism. On the other hand, Hillary Clinton placed the designation of the 
Haqqani network as a foreign terrorist organization within “our robust campaign of diplomatic, 
military, and intelligence pressure on the network, demonstrating the United States’ resolve to 
degrade the organization’s ability to execute violent attacks.”24 Given these divergent views on 
the policy utility of FTO listing, we believe social science theory and methods can inform the 
policy debate. In this study, we demonstrate that any impact of FTO listing on terrorist activity 
depends on the characteristics of the target.  
 
A political economy theory of blacklisting 
 
To develop an explanation for the effects of the FTO blacklist, we study political, 
economic, and social connections between terrorist groups and their supporters (targets of the 
GPI) and the United States government (issuer of the GPI). We provide a typology of the 
financial bases of terrorist groups, examine terrorism supporters’ reactions to the FTO listing, 
and attempt to predict the ultimate impact on terrorist groups’ activities.  
In sociology and criminology, blacklisting is hypothesized to have two divergent effects: 
positive and negative.25 On one the one hand, deterring deviant behaviors using blacklist could 
reduce terrorism. On the other hand, blacklisting can trigger negative responses from the target, 
creating more non-conformist actions.26 This logic produces an expectation that the FTO 
																																								 																				
19 See Ranstorp and Wilkinson 2013; Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 130 S.Ct. 2705. 
20 India and Russia focus their terrorist organization lists on domestic opponents. In our dataset, the 
correlation between U.S. FTO list and other countries’ lists is as follows: Canada, .81, Australia .53, 
EU .61, UK .53, and UN .40, Russia .22, and India .07. On the comparison among terrorist lists, see also 
Freedman 2010 and Beck and Miner 2013.  
21 DeYoung 2012. More recently, the former U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper said 
“for whatever reason it seemed as though our listing a group had an impact. People noticed and the rest of 
the world cared, but as far as impact on us in intelligence, it really didn’t have any.” (Legrand 2018). 
22 Lobe and Ramsey 2012. 
23 Hufbauer and Moll 2007. 
24 BBC. 2012. “U.S. to designate Haqqani network as terror group” 7 September 2012. Available at 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19521773   
25 See the review of literature in Paternoster and Bachman 2012. 
26 The two competing theories -- “labeling theory” and “deterrence theory” – help theorize the potential 
effect of FTO listing. Labeling theory in criminology proposes that criminals react negatively to negative 
labeling, which leads to more crimes, not less. Labeling theory therefore would predict that FTO listing 
would lead to more terrorism. On the other hand, deterrence theory would point out the legal and 
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designation can galvanize groups to carry out more attacks. Adjudicating between these 
divergent expectations, we develop a political economy explanation of how the FTO list affects 
terrorist attacks. We argue that listing generates less terrorist activity when the target is 
vulnerable to political processes triggered by designation. Conversely, we would expect the 
terrorist list will have no impact or has a potential to create more terrorist activity when the target 
is less vulnerable to the regulatory pressure ensued by the FTO process.  
Vulnerability depends on the structure of funding base for each terrorist group. Some 
funding is easier to monitor and disrupt, and terrorist groups with such funding sources will be 
more likely to be affected by FTO designation. Private funding, such as donations and diaspora 
support, is especially vulnerable to sanctions and social stigma. Terrorist groups that depend on 
private funding are likely impacted by blacklists, as supporters suffer legal, financial, and social 
consequences. In contrast, funding sources that are more difficult to detect and provide greater 
autonomy to terrorist groups – like criminal activities – are unlikely to be impacted by FTO 
listing. In some cases, blacklisting these groups may even contribute to increased attacks when 
terrorists adapt and gain notoriety.  
The effect of blacklisting depends on the financial support of targeted groups for several 
reasons. The financial support network of the blacklisted target gives us clues about the 
vulnerability of the target, responses of supporters, and regulatory issues for the U.S. If the 
support network is clandestine, blacklisting will not shame and stigmatize supporters of the 
terrorist organization. As a result, the target organization will not change its behavior. In contrast, 
if a support network is open and subject to shaming, blacklisting could change how the target 
operates, by eroding its support network. Consequently, the target would be weakened and 
blacklisting will reduce terrorist attacks. Terrorist groups might not necessarily be shamed by the 
FTO list, but their supporters might be shamed, which can impact how terrorist groups operate. 
This line of argument highlights how target heterogeneity elicits different responses to the 
blacklisting. Terrorist groups that rely one type of open funding may behave differently from 
those that rely on other clandestine funding types. We now explore the resulting sensitivity to 
blacklisting of different funding sources in more depth. 
 
Varieties of terrorism funding  
 
Financing is essential to terrorist groups, as it provides resources to support members and 
fund operations. Although lone wolves do not require funding systems, most terrorist 
organizations actively manage their funds and to pay members and to maintain operational 
cells.27 Most importantly, funding has consequences for terror acts. Some attacks have few costs, 
but others such as coordinated hijacking or military actions require sustained hierarchical 
operations.28 Disruption of their financial and support network reduces terrorists’ capability over 
time by reducing their capacity to pay recruits, launch attacks and build political capacity.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
economic consequences for the terrorist groups as well as the likelihood of them being affected by the 
designation. Deterrent theory therefore would predict that blacklisting leads to fewer crimes. Our theory 
seeks to reconcile the two views. 
27 Shapiro 2013; Vittiori 2015. Recent research shows that AQI and ISIS dispersed funding to maintain 
recruits and to augment their attack capacity (Johnston et al. 2016) 
28 For example, the 2004 Madrid train bombings cost an estimated USD 10,000, and the 2002 Bali 
bombings an estimated USD 50,000 (FATF 2008, pp.7-8). 
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We identify and classify four primary ways for terrorist groups to fund their activities: 1) 
private funding, 2) state sponsorship, 3) terrorist networks, and 4) criminal activities.29 The four 
funding types differ in “financial vulnerability,” social pressures on supporters from blacklisting, 
as well as how adaptable terrorist groups could be in securing new types of funds.  
Private funding includes money from private actors – business, charities or individuals. 
Examples include money from private donors, charities,30 or diaspora populations.31 Private 
donors and charities are directly hit by the material support ban that follows FTO designation. 
These actors face fines or have their operations shut down if they are deemed to support terrorist 
groups. Banks, businesses, and other organizations are also affected by the FTO designation. If 
they are branded as entities that provide “material support” for terrorist organizations, they could 
be sanctioned. The attention given to the Holy Land Foundation, a Hamas charity, is one 
example of a material support ban triggered by the FTO designation.32 A U.S. Supreme Court 
case, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, also shows how the FTO list has created new 
restrictions on how international humanitarian organizations engage with non-state conflict 
actors.33  
Private donations are relatively easy for governments to monitor, especially for larger 
groups with extensive financial flows. Also, some private actors are more likely face the shame 
and stigmatization of blacklisting along with sanctions. The reaction of the Tamil Tigers diaspora 
population is a case in point. The Tamil diaspora helped fund the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, but FTO designation restricted the flow of resources. Following the 
American lead, Canada and UK raised barriers for charities channeling funds to the LTTE for 
fear of being branded as supporting terrorism.34 Before the FTO listing of LTTE, the Tamil 
diaspora in Europe and the United States often contributed financially to the “freedom 
fighters,”35 but opinions changed when the LTTE was branded as “terrorists.” The diaspora 
withdrew their support after FTO designation, not just because of the threat of legal punishment 
but also because of shame and stigmatization.36 Stigmatization was likely at work eliciting 
responses from donor community and ultimately affecting LTTE operations.37 
State sponsors are another source of funds for terrorist groups.38 Libya, Syria, Iran, 
Pakistan and Iraq, among others, have provided sanctuaries or given weapons to terrorist groups 
to advance their geopolitical interests. State sponsorship subjects terrorist groups to the political 
																																								 																				
29 On the types of terrorism financing, see FATF 2008; Vittori 2012. 
30 See the list of charities in Treasury Department 2016.  
31 See Hess 2007 for nexus between diaspora and terrorism. 
32 See Levitt 2004 for more examples involving charities and terrorism. 
33 561 U.S. 1, 130 S.Ct. 2705. Also see Modirzadeh 2011; Said 2015. 
34 See International Crisis Group 2010. 
35 Considered the claim of five defendants of Tamil diaspora that LTTE is not a terrorist organization, but 
a liberation movement, in the Hague district court in 2011 LTTE case (as discussed in Wellens 2015, 
pp.88-91). 
36 LTTE was said to have affected by the FTO designation due to the dwindling funding from diaspora 
offices in Canada and UK, but its demise was eventually caused by battle losses against the Sri Lankan 
government. See Roberts 2012. 
37 We however recognize that some private funders may be immune to the FTO listing if they have 
particular religious or geopolitical interests. See Burr and Collins 2006 for the case of Islamic charities. 
Even in these cases, charities are subject to monitoring by national authorities are more observable 
criminal activities.  
38 Byman 2005, Carter 2012. 
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whims of their sponsors.39 Depending on changes in the domestic coalition of the sponsor 
country or shifting geopolitical tides, terrorist groups expose themselves to the risks of 
fluctuating funding, so many organizations tend to seek self-sufficiency.40 For the 
implementation of the FTO list, sanctioning state sponsorship is complicated by potential issue 
linkages. Efforts to sanction states for sponsoring terrorism may be hindered by other foreign 
policy concerns. For instance, the U.S. has struggled to address Pakistan’s relationship with 
Islamic militants, including several groups on the FTO list. Furthermore, state sponsors are 
unlikely to change their behavior in response to FTO designation. Countries view sponsoring 
armed groups as means of advancing their geopolitical interests, making FTO designation 
comparatively unimportant.41 So, even though the FTO list signals to state sponsors of terrorism, 
designation alone will not impact state support.  
Terrorist networks, or alliances among terrorist organizations, are the third source of 
financial and logistical support to facilitate attacks.42 Heavily networked terrorist organizations 
can survive longer by reducing mobilization concerns.43 As well, network provides a valuable 
support for many groups especially if they operate under restrictive environments. Consider ties 
between al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen), al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM in Mali), and al-Shabaab (Somalia). Ideological affinity, shared training, and 
operating reach give the groups more power. We expect that groups relying on terrorist networks 
are less vulnerable to FTO designation, as they already operate beyond the reach of sanctions and 
monitoring.  
Criminal activities are an essential source of funding for many terrorist organizations.44 
Terrorist groups fund their groups from the profits of criminal activities, such as kidnapping, 
ransom, extortions, illicit trade, and drug trafficking.45 Involvement in crime contributes to 
organizational longevity.46 Criminal activities, compared to other funding sources, are low on 
financial vulnerability. The clandestine nature of criminal activities makes them difficult to trace 
and sanction. Local criminal activities such as extracting forced donations from local business or 
civilian population are especially difficult to observe. International criminal activities are 
relatively more detectable than domestic/local extortion activities. Even then, sanctions are hard 
to enforce when trade occurs in black markets or international buyers engage in sanction-busting 
activities.47 In addition, terrorist groups relying on criminal activities are often immune from 
blacklisting, because their funding is autonomous. Low financial vulnerability in criminal 
activities is reinforced by shifts from one criminal source to the other. For example, Al-Shabaab 
moved from black market charcoal to extortion and ivory trading, making their funding versatile 
																																								 																				
39 Salehyan et al. 2014. 
40 Johnston et al. 2016. 
41 This is in line with the finding in Phillips 2018 that the FTO effects differ between U.S. allies and non-
allies.  
42 Karmon 2005; Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Bacon 2018. 
43 Phillips 2014. 
44 Shelley 2014. 
45 For example, Hezbollah, despite its service provision, exhibit the characteristics of crime syndicates, 
engaged in illicit trades. See Leuprecht et al. 2015. 
46 Piazza and Piazza 2017. 
47 Early 2015. 
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and adaptable.48 As a result of funding-autonomy and adaptability, groups that fund their 
operations through criminal activities are unlikely to be affected by FTO designation.  
 
Responses by the U.S., other states, and international organizations 
 
The FTO list can impact a proscribed group via various domestic and international 
political channels. In the domestic arena, FTO designation triggers interagency cooperation for 
proper implementation among the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security and the 
Treasury.49 Agencies implement financial sanctions, immigration bans, and oversee the legality 
of sanctions. Abroad, the U.S. government uses the FTO list as a foreign policy signal to 
terrorist-hosting governments. According to the State Department, FTO listing “signals to other 
governments our concern about named organizations.”50 In advocating the listing of Haqqani 
network, a terrorism expert on South Asia said in a congressional testimony: “Pakistani officials 
repeatedly questioned why they should take military action against the Haqqanis if the U.S. was 
seeking a negotiated settlement. With this terrorist designation, the U.S. leaves no doubt on 
where it stands on the issue and thus removes a Pakistani excuse for failing to take military 
action.”51  
The FTO designation spurs host governments to take action against proscribed groups.52 Listing 
a group sometimes leads to U.S. military and diplomatic support for host governments. 53 Such 
aid helps U.S. allies in their counter-terrorism efforts, which can be guided by the FTO list.54 The 
																																								 																				
48 Radtke and Jo 2018. 
49 Decker 2014. Cronin 2003, 3 also writes that the FTO designation “provides a clear focal point for 
interagency cooperation.” 
50 Fact Sheet: Secretary of State designates Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO's); office of the 
Spokesman, Washington DC. October 5, 2001. 
http://fas.org/irp/news/2001/10/fr100501.html  
51 Curtis 2012.  
52 Note the principal-agent relationship between the host government and the United States (See Bapat 
2011 for the analysis of moral hazard problem in the context of U.S. counterterrorism effort.). Not all 
states share the preferences of the United States. The government might not necessarily fight the terrorist 
organization absent military aid. The government might have an understanding with terrorist groups, or 
the government might want to rely on aid relationships and prefer that that conflict continue to secure 
further aid.  As an agent, then, a resident government might have a diverging preference from the United 
States.  
53 Increased foreign aid to Uganda after the designation of the Lord’s Resistance Army as an FTO in 
December 2011 is one such example (Mills 2015, p.138 in particular; also see Finnström 2008).  
54 See Boutton and Carter 2014.The U.S. appears to increase military aid to FTO-resident countries after 
FTO designation. We examined the increase amount after 2001 to FTO-holding countries. For example, 
the Philippines received about 1 million ($1,330,744) in Year 1999 but 15 million ($55,127,153) in Year 
2002 for the category of “Foreign Military Financing (FMF)” Program. Those are grants for the 
acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training, which is essential for “building partner 
nation capacity and helping allies defend themselves.” Such dramatic increases are not observed in other 
non-FTO resident countries. See “Foreign Military Financing Program” House Appropriations Committee 
Reports, 112th Congress (2011-2012) House Report 112-494: State, Foreign Operations and Related 
Programs Appropriations Bill, 2013. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/cpquery/?&sid=cp112WcH61&r_n=hr494.112&dbname=cp112&&sel=TOC_218118. On how the 
effects of FTO status seem to be more powerful in U.S. allied countries, see Phillips 2018. 
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terrorist list also produces elite responses within the host governments of FTO groups.55 
According to Julia Morse’s data on counter-terrorism financing (2006-2014), a larger number of 
FTO-host countries have instituted new laws compared to non-FTO-host-countries to tackle 
terrorism financing after FTO designation of their residing terrorist groups.56 Among the 71 
countries that created counter-terrorism financing domestic regulations, 24 countries have FTOs 
in their territory. This includes almost all states that with FTO-listed groups. In one example, 
around the time several Pakistani groups were listed as FTOs, the Pakistani government 
established Financial Monitoring Unit at Ministry of Finance, amended Anti-Terrorism Act of 
1997 and subsequently enacted an Anti-Money Laundering Act in 2010.57  
A specific way FTO designation affects designated groups, is by influencing other 
countries’ lists. The United States seems to be an important agenda-setter regarding which 
groups are counterterrorism priorities.58 After the U.S. list was created in 1997, the United 
Kingdom created its own list, using similar policies, in 2000. The European Union, and countries 
beyond Europe, took similar steps after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.59 The U.S. 
listing seems to influence other countries’ designation decisions, multiplying impact on listed 
groups. 
Governments with terrorist groups in their countries often exploit FTO status to 
stigmatize domestic enemies and use it as an opportunity for repression. For example, the Sri 
Lankan government used LTTE’s FTO status to justify their actions and bolster domestic 
political support for military campaigns. As a counter-terrorism tool, the FTO list triggers 
military and political responses that would not otherwise be possible for host governments. FTO 
designation by the U.S. became a powerful policy tool for elites within host countries, especially 
after 9/11. Elites facing internal opposition can use FTO designations to clamp down on long-
time foes.  
The long-running conflict in the Philippines illustrates this impact of the U.S. FTO 
designation. The Philippine government has faced an insurgency in the Mindanao region for over 
three decades and the FTO designation of Abu Sayyaf provided the government political and 
military tools to fight this group and other insurgents. More recently, the Duterte administration 
opposed the U.S. attempt to remove the Communist Party of the Philippines from the FTO list.60 
The case demonstrates how the FTO designation becomes a political and policy-framing tool on 
the part of domestic elites in the U.S. and host countries. 
Beyond the U.S. and host government politics, the FTO list impacts transnational 
political processes, with consequences for terrorists’ attack capacity. UN Designation of FTO-
linked charity organizations closely follow the U.S., usually with five to ten days’ delay.61 Also, 
charities and banks that operate internationally must ensure money does not flow to terrorist 
organizations for the fear of being tagged as “material supporters” of terrorism.  
																																								 																				
55 Here we use the term “host” in the general sense to include countries with FTOs in their territory, 
regardless of whether the state authorizes the groups’ actions or existence. 
56 Chapter 3 by Morse, in this volume. 
57 Zahid 2015. 
58 Beck and Miner (2013, 852-853) find prior U.S. designation is associated with subsequent UK or EU 
designation. 
59 Jarvis and LeGrand 2018. 
60 Gagalac 2017.  
61 Treasury Department 2016. It is no coincidence that al-Qaeda related entities were designated as UN-
terrorist list only a few days after the U.S. FTO designation. 
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How terrorist groups react to blacklist 
 
Like governments and international organizations, terrorist groups respond to FTO 
designation. Their reactions to blacklisting are diverse. Some contest the listing. Mujahadeen-e-
Khalq (MEK), for example, demanded the revocation of its designation for years and finally 
achieved it in 2012.62 Others have responded to designation with defiance. The al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigades, an extremist group in Palestine under Fatah control, responded to the designation 
decision with a statement resolving to “continue until we vanquish the occupation.”63 The third 
category of terrorist groups attempt to evade the legal reach of FTO designation. Harkat ul-
Mujahedin has frequently changed its name to avoid sanctions and disguised itself as a charity 
organization.64 Other terrorist groups engage in public relations as a counter to FTO listing. Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen started publishing its online magazine, 
Inspire, in July 2010, shortly after its FTO designation in January 2010, reacting to the 
designation by enhancing its social status to draw recruits.65  
Part of these reactions is a function of from where these groups draw support. Terrorist 
groups’ financial bases are important for determining how much FTO designation will penetrate 
their operations and how they react to the blacklist. Terrorist groups that have relied on criminal 
activities will retain freedom of action. In contrast, groups that have relied on private funding are 
more vulnerable to the consequences of FTO listing, either because the sponsor was shamed (as 
in Tamil diaspora) or subject to domestic or international sanctions on money trail (with the help 
of Financial Action Task Force). From the perspective of the monitor (U.S. authorities), reliance 
on private funding would result in relatively high visibility in tracking down the flow of funds.66 
Additionally, other countries with terrorist groups, especially U.S. allies, would mobilize their 
own resources to catalyze their anti-terrorism efforts. The high detectability allows for sanctions 
to be implemented, and some private supporters will also face stigmatization. These domestic 
and international political and social processes lead to our main hypothesis, which we test in the 
next section. 
 
																																								 																				
62 In petitioning against its designation, the MEK noted that “A FTO designation results in “dire 
consequences” for an organization, its members and other supporters.” (MEK v. State Department, 2012: 
3). 
63 Levitt 2002. Analysts noted that the designation also signaled to Fatah that they could be next, as many 
members of the al-Aqsa Martyr Brigade were associated with Fatah’s military wing. This again 
demonstrates that the message of blacklisting via FTO designation gets to the target terrorist group as well 
as other terrorist groups.   
64 State Department 2014 “Amendments to, and Maintenance of, the Terrorist Designations of Harakat ul-
Mujahidin” Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington DC, August 7, 2014. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/230373.htm 
65 “Al Qaeda Organization in the Arabian Peninsula” Global Security. Available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida-arabia.htm  
66 This is not to say that private funding is easy to detect. Charities are sometimes difficult to detect 
because of their global reach, name changes, and shell companies. We argue that private funding is 
comparatively easier to monitor than say, the terrorist funding based on criminal activities. The relative 
easiness is the key. We recognize the difficulty of tracking down overseas remittances for example. In 
many cases, even if the funds are tracked down, linking them to material support for a certain terrorist 
group is uncertain.  
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Hypothesis: If a terrorist group relies on private funding and is subject to FTO 
designation, the group is more likely to reduce attacks, compared to FTO-
designated groups that rely on other types of funding. 
 
Statistical analysis of FTO listing impact  
 
To test our hypothesis, we built a dataset on terrorist groups between 1970 and 2014, by 
extending the dataset by Gaibulloev and Sandler (2013) that covers the period between 1970 and 
2007.67 The unit of analysis is terrorist group-year, as we analyze the pattern of terrorist attacks 
in response to the FTO listing. Our dataset includes 412 terrorist groups.68 A terrorist group 
enters the data when it is first formed, which is often made clear by its first claimed attacks, and 
exits the data when it is no longer operational for more than five years or is disbanded. Since 
FTO listing started in 1997, we have 27 years of data before the FTO listing and 17 years after 
the FTO listing.69 Given that the FTO list started in 1997, some terrorist groups are designated 
years after their formation. For example, al-Qaeda formed in 1988, but it was only listed as a 
FTO in 1999 after a threat assessment based on the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania.   
In our dataset, a terrorist group is a subnational political organization that uses 
terrorism,70 where terrorism is defined as “the use of politically motivated violence against non-
combatants to cause intimidation or fear among a target audience.”71 Based on these definitions 
of terrorist organizations and terrorism, our dataset includes various non-state armed groups, 
such as those often called rebel groups or paramilitaries – as long as they use terrorist tactics. 
Our dataset excludes peaceful movements or violent non-state actors that do not use terror tactics. 
This general definition produces different set of terrorist organizations from what the United 
States brands as “foreign terrorist organizations.” This difference between regular scholarly 
terrorist group lists and the FTO list highlights the highly political nature of the FTO designation.  
																																								 																				
67 In extending the dataset up to 2014, we focused on constructing reasonable comparison sets – terrorist 
groups that are comparable to the GS data. We used the list of groups from the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) and then we excluded lone wolves and amorphous groups. Individual terrorists (i.e. lone 
wolves) do not fit the “group” standard, and other GTD “groups” include actors who are at best suspected 
of one attack, or primarily engage in other forms of contentious politics. We also removed actors that are 
coded as groups by the GTD, but have a group name of “Jihadists” or “Leftists,” suggesting that the 
perpetrators were not necessarily part of a formal organization, but that GTD coders attached a name 
indicating what they knew about them. These criteria are consistent with Gaibulloev and Sandler’s coding, 
and with other terrorist group databases, as in Cronin 2009. 
68 The number of groups used is consistent with some other global analyses of terrorist groups, which 
include several hundred organizations. Blomberg, Gaibulloev, and Sandler 2011 include 367 groups in 
their analysis, and Cronin 2009 includes 450. Neither author, however, tried to find organizational 
information as specific as ours, regarding funding sources. Other missing data issues, including how the 
groups used in the sample are comparable with FTOs, are discussed below. 
69 The mean duration for terrorist groups is 12 years, with a minimum of 1 year and a maximum of 45 
years (our observation window of 1970-2014). About 50% of groups dissolve after 8 years. 
70 Phillips 2015. This is consistent with other studies, such as Hoffman 2006, Carter 2012, and Jones and 
Libicki 2008. 
71 Jones and Libicki, 2008: 3. 
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Our dependent variable is the number of terrorist attacks associated with each group in a 
year.72 Terrorist attacks are an important outcome of interest because they are the main output of 
groups and reflect organizational capacity.73 In our dataset, terrorist attacks include both 
domestic and transnational terrorism, as some domestic attacks in other countries might also 
affect U.S. global security interests.74 The mean of the dependent variable is approximately 
seven annual attacks, but ranges from 0 to 1032.   
The first set of key independent variables includes our measures of funding sources. We 
classify terrorist funding into four binary variables: private funding, state sponsorship, terrorist 
network, and criminal activities. For each type, we construct an indicator75 to denote if a 
particular group has a particular type of funding.  
Private funding (82 groups) included financing for terrorist organizations from members, 
charitable donations, and other miscellaneous sources. State sponsorship (85 groups) was coded 
based on information which clarified whether a group was funded in part or in whole by a state 
entity. Terrorist network (57 groups) was coded 1 if a group received resources from other 
terrorist organizations. Criminal activities (101 groups) were coded based on illicit funding such 
as bank robberies, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, or the drug trade. To collect the funding 
data, the research team utilized official or reliable academic sources, mostly based on the group 
profiles from the Mapping Terrorism Project at Stanford as well as data from the START (Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism) Center at University of Maryland.  
We were unable to code data for 230 obscure groups due to a lack of adequate data. This 
restricts our analysis to a smaller sample than desired (about 500 groups out of 1000). But we are 
confident to proceed with our analysis because the missing values mainly come from groups that 
are too small to be placed on the FTO list. Most groups with missing funding data have few 
recorded attacks and members.76  
The second key independent variable is FTO designation of a group. FTO is a binary 
measure indicating whether a group is on the FTO list in a particular year. A total of 49 groups 
																																								 																				
72 We draw attacks data from the Global Terrorism Database. We could have opted for other dependent 
variables such as group survival (whether a group survives or not, as in Gaibulloev and Sandler 2013) or 
fate (ending in negotiation, military defeat or victory as in Carter 2012). We chose to analyze attacks first 
because survival and fates require distinct theorizing (e.g. why terrorist groups want to negotiate) and the 
FTO effect might have less of a long-term effect (on survival) than a short-term effect (on attack patterns). 
73 For these reasons, other studies use terrorist attacks as the dependent variable (e.g. Nemeth 2014, Li 
2005).  
74 One of the criteria for the FTO designation was the threat to U.S. national security. In the analysis 
reported in this chapter, we did not count transnational attacks after 2007 but mainly incorporated 
domestic attacks. The results before 2007 with both transnational and domestic attacks do not 
substantively change compared to the whole sample.   
75 The ideal measure for us would be a measure of funding employing the concept of portfolio – reflecting 
the share of revenue for each funding type. This would give us a more valid measure for terrorist groups’ 
financial vulnerability. Such information is present for some prominent groups that receive sufficient 
attention. For example, ISIL is funded by oil (38.7%), contracting work (37.9%), spoils (19.7%), real 
estate (2.8%) and miscellaneous 0.9%) activities, with little few private donations or foreign state 
sponsorship. AQIM acquired funds mostly from sales of spoils with geographic and temporal variations 
(Shapiro et al. 2016). But for many terrorist groups, even rough data do not exist. Currently, we are 
missing 40% of our funding data (4427 available out of 7397 total observations). This means that in most 
cases, funding information is not easy to track down, let alone the exact share of revenues. 
76 This claim is based on a logit analysis of missing observations in the funding variables. 
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are on the FTO list at some point. Some groups are delisted, switching the FTO indicator from 
one to zero. We interact the FTO variable with dummy indicators of funding type in our 
statistical analysis to examine the differential effects of FTO effect across funding types.  
We also controlled for other correlates of terrorist attacks and FTO designation. Group 
size is a variable that measures the size of a terrorist group. It is a logarithm of a group's 
membership at its peak.77 Religious group indicates if a group is characterized by religious 
motivations, rather than left-wing, right-wing, nationalist, or others.78 Political regime type is the 
democracy score for the country the group is primarily based in, ranging from 0-10 indicating 
most autocratic to most democratic. It comes from the Quality of Government project.79 
Democratic countries often experience more terrorism.80 We control for GDP per capita and 
population as economic development and country size might influence occurrence of terrorist 
attacks.81  
Models include two variables that account for time trend and temporal patterns of 
terrorist attacks, as the capability to launch attacks is likely to change slowly. Year trend – a time 
counter for each year –accounts for global trends in terrorist attacks. To account for 
autocorrelation of terrorist attacks over time, we included Attacks (lag) – the number of terrorist 
attacks by a group in the previous year. Including the lagged dependent variable means our 
model is equivalent to estimating changes in attacks.  
Since our dependent variable is a count, we employed a count model that accounts for 
between subject heterogeneity as well as the over-dispersion of the data.82 About two-thirds of 
the observations are zero for the dependent variable, and the occurrence of zeroes is probably 
non-random. To address this, we use zero-inflated negative binomial regression, a two-stage 
model where the first stage estimates the likelihood of a zero, and the second stage is a negative 
binomial regression.83 The first stage includes all the independent variables of the count models 
except the interaction terms. It includes the variables that are likely to contribute to the 
generation of zeros in our dependent variable.  
Table 1 reports our main results. Model 1 provides baseline estimates, and Models 2-5 
include interaction terms to estimate FTO effects conditional on funding types. Interestingly, in 
Model 1 the coefficient on FTO is statistically significant and positively signed, suggestion that 
FTO status is correlated with increased terrorist attacks. However, this is an unconditional effect 
that does not take into consideration the heterogeneity of funding types. Model 2 includes the 
interaction of FTO status and private funding, and this interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant. This suggests that terrorist groups that use private funding are less likely 
to undertake attacks with FTO designation.84 Private funding is positively correlated with attacks 
																																								 																				
77 Gaibulloev and Sandler 2013. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Dahlberg et al. 2017. The variable is primarily based on Freedom House, but uses the Polity2 variable 
to impute missing Freedom House data. 
80 Li 2005; Chenoweth 2013. 
81 Gaibulloev and Sandler 2013.  
82 The mean of our dependent variable, number of terrorist attacks, is 6.578 and the standard deviation is 
29.917, indicating the overdispersion of the data.  
83 See Cameron and Trivedi 2013; Long and Freese 2014. A Vuong test suggests the zero-inflated model 
is preferable to regular negative binomial models, but we also report the results of negative binomial 
models in supplemental document because both types of models are commonly used in terrorist studies. 
84 We also conducted separate analysis with different types of terrorism, such as kidnapping and suicide 
bombing. The key result for Model 2 in relation to privately funded groups and FTO holds for kidnapping, 
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in the absence of FTO designation. None of the other funding types has a statistically significant 
interaction effect with FTO status.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 reports the substantive effects of FTO status conditional upon funding types. 
The estimated impact of FTO status on a terrorist group that does not receive private funding 
such as donations is about 5 more attacks per year, with other variables held at their means. By 
contrast, the impact of FTO status is not conditional upon any of the other funding types. In the 
case of groups with terrorist networks or criminal activities, FTO appears to be associated with a 
slight increase in attacks, compared to groups without such funding. This provides some support 
for the idea that terrorist groups that use private funding are especially vulnerable to FTO 
designation.  
For the approximately 75 percent of terrorist groups that do not receive private funding, 
FTO designation is associated with more attacks. However, there is no such association for the 
terrorist groups that use private funding. FTO designation appears to limit the momentum of 
privately funded groups that might otherwise have launched additional attacks.            
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Regarding control variables, some results are consistent with the literature. The lagged 
dependent variable is statistically significant and positively signed, suggesting groups’ attacks 
the previous year are associated the current year’s value. Larger groups are likely to wage more 
attacks, which is consistent with other studies. The coefficient on Religious group is positively 
signed, but is usually statistically significant. This is consistent with mixed results in other 
studies. The coefficients on the state-level independent variables are mostly insignificant. This is 
perhaps because group-level variables are more important for explaining group behavior. Note 
that other studies of terrorist group attacks or lethality often do not find associations between 
these factors and, for example, regime type.85 The results are robust to changes in estimator, such 
as regular negative binomial regression,86 and also consistent to the inclusion of other control 
variables, such as other terrorist organization lists from Australia, Canada, EU, India, Russia, and 
UK.   
We further checked whether non-random selection into the FTO list affects our results. 
The process of designation may influence the estimates for the FTO effects on terrorist attacks, 
so we examined whether that blacklisting process affects our inferences regarding FTO 
designation and terrorist attacks. Certain groups are likely to be designated as FTO groups in the 
first place. FTOs are large in size; they have a history of substantial and damaging terrorist 
attacks. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that U.S. allies are actively involved in the FTO 
listing process. FTO list also includes a disproportionate number of Islamic groups.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
but not suicide bombing. This is consistent with our theory that funding types will affect expensive 
operations such as large scale terrorist attacks or kidnapping (which requires organization and planning), 
but do not travel to smaller scale terror operations such as suicide bombing. Results on file with authors. 
85 e.g., Asal and Rethemyer 2008.  
86 Results on file with the authors. 
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More critically, the U.S. might strategically select easy targets such as terrorist groups 
with private funding. Taking stock of these correlates of FTO selection (group size, U.S. ally,87 
past history of attacks, religious group, private funding dummy), we use coarsened exact 
matching (CEM) to match listed and not listed observations across different funding types, 
taking into account the FTO selection process.88 CEM coarsens the data by placing bins and 
strata to create treatment and control groups (e.g. creating 43 matched strata out of selection 
covariates, find exact matches (e.g. a large group in control reservoir, matched to a large group in 
treatment reservoir), and ultimately to produce comparable matches between FTO and non-FTO 
observations. After implementing CEM, we estimate the zero-inflated negative binomial 
regression models with the weights created by CEM. The results are analogous to the ones 
reported in Table 1, except that the significance of the interactive term in Model 2 (private 
funding) is somewhat attenuated for a two-tailed hypothesis test. This check lends support for 
our conclusion about the differential impacts of blacklisting depending on the heterogeneity of 
funding among terrorist groups.  
Finally, since FTO designation usually comes with the sanctioning tools such as travel 
bans or asset freezes, it is important to distinguish the effect of listing from sanctioning. 
Although we cannot cleanly parse out the effect of sanctions from listing, we can at least 
systematically test whether the listing effect holds when sanctioning is weak. We exploit the fact 
that sanctioning was weak before 9/11 and that increased dramatically after 9/11. If we are 
correct about the listing effect, we should still see the hypothesized private funding effect even 
for pre-9/11 sample. We report the results for pre- and post-9/11 in Table 2. It is essentially the 
same model reported in Table 1, Model 2 with two subsamples. We see that listing effect still 
exists pre-9/11 when sanctioning regime was weak, and that the FTO effect is relatively 
pronounced after 9/11 In light of this evidence, we conclude that listing effect is not ignorable 
and is fortified by sanctioning measures. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
A few examples illustrate how our expectations work. We give examples of al-Qaeda, 
MEK, and the FARC to highlight the mechanisms we outline in this chapter, with regard to 
funding types, FTO designation, and responses by the terrorist organization.  
The example of al-Qaeda demonstrates how terrorist organizations adapt. Al-Qaeda 
depended on opium trade before 1999.89 With the support from the private donors from Saudi 
Arabia, the al-Qaeda central managed to carry out the September 11 attacks, even after 
designation as FTO in 1998. After the funds dried up with the augmented sanctions after the 9/11, 
the group transformed itself to be heavily linked to other terrorist groups and formed a broader 
network. FTO designation had little impact on al-Qaeda because their funding was hard to 
monitor and sanction after al-Qaeda adapted itself to new regulatory environment.90  
Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK), in contrast, exclusively relied on U.S. political support and 
diaspora networks in Europe. The legal actions by MeK challenging FTO process as well as its 
																																								 																				
87 U.S. Ally variable is a binary indicator of whether a host country has one of the military pacts: alliance 
treaty, defense pact, non-aggression pact, or entente. The data source is the Correlates of War Alliances 
database. Gibler 2009. International Military Alliances, 1648-2012. 
88 Iacus et al. 2012. Results on file with the authors. 
89 UNSCR 1267. 
90 Stern and Modi 2008 highlight the importance of studying terrorist groups’ adaptability. 
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renewed political lobbying after their FTO designation in 1997 are one indication that FTO 
listing indeed affected the terrorist organization’s operations. Their dependency on private 
funding, donations, seems to have made FTO listing more effective for this group than it was for 
others.    
The example of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) presents a 
different degree of vulnerability compared to MeK. The FARC once received support from Cuba, 
but mainly depended on drug trafficking and criminal activities. Criminal activities are difficult 
to monitor and punish through the sanctions imposition on the groups, and the stigmatization 
effect would be almost absent. Our political economy theory of blacklisting would predict that 
FARC would be less affected by the direct blacklisting or associated sanctions. The indirect path 
of U.S. support for the Colombian government in the war on drugs had later had the effect of 
reducing FARC’s attack capability. This was not a direct consequence of the FTO designation, 
but associated ally support and consequence of designation politics.  
The diverging attack series of the three groups in Figure 2 match our expectations about 
funding vulnerability and FTO designation.91 All three groups were FTO-listed in 1997 but their 
attack patterns diverge: al-Qaeda attacks increased, MeK eventually reduced attacks, while 
FARC retained the same level of activity and even increased attacks, although eventually 
reducing attacks at the end of the series due to Plan Colombia and other pressures. The only 
group to show a substantial and sustained decrease in its attacks was MeK, which depended on 
private funding and was therefore more vulnerable to blacklisting. These examples serve as a 
reminder that funding heterogeneity might matter in understanding how the target responds to 
the blacklist. The examples indicate the variety of terrorist groups in terms of financing, and they 
suggest that recognizing heterogeneity is one of the key aspects to policy responses. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The power of GPIs, such as blacklisting, depends on the nature of the target. Blacklisting 
can change a target’s behavior when the target is especially vulnerable to the erosion of its 
support base. We focused on terrorist groups’ funding structure and vulnerability in assessing the 
potential impact of the blacklisting. The target’s vulnerability to blacklisting depends on terrorist 
groups’ social, political, and economic relations. Terrorists themselves may not be shamed by the 
blacklist, but some of their social circles or supporters might feel shamed and vulnerable to 
changing regulations.  
The importance of target heterogeneity has broader implications for the exercise of power 
in world politics. Not all targets of attempts at influence are equally vulnerable. In the case of 
terrorist groups, funding sources play a key role. Our findings also address the literature on 
naming and shaming. Consistent with the literature that finds both effective and ineffective 
tools,92 we find that naming and shaming could contribute to the reduction of terrorist attacks in 
																																								 																				
91 For al-Qaeda series, we took al-Qaeda central as well as other associated/affiliated groups that have 
alleged alliance with the al-Qaeda central. 
92 Both DeMeritt 2012 and Krain 2012 find naming and shaming by international organizations reduces 
atrocities; Hafner-Burton 2008 however finds perverse effects of human rights naming and shaming 
where some governments ramp up violations. 
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some groups that rely on private funding. But in other cases where terrorists can adapt to new 
funding sources, naming and shaming using blacklist could have no discernible impact or even 
unintended consequences.  
Any effect of blacklisting will be attenuated when terrorist groups adapt and reinvent 
themselves. These potentially unintended consequences of backlash or setbacks should be 
considered and carefully monitored by policymakers. Combatting more adaptive groups will 
require other policy responses beyond blacklisting. Therefore, future policies should address 
target heterogeneity and the possibility that blacklisting may have intended and unintended 
consequences. The conditional effectiveness of blacklisting can be extended to other naming and 
shaming settings, especially the aspects of the heterogeneity of funding reliance on the side of 
target.   
The analysis of the FTO list echoes the main theme of this volume on GPIs. Blacklisting 
triggers political and social mobilization of domestic and international actors. By re-framing the 
debate and boundary between legitimate and illegitimate activities globally, FTO designation 
engages, enables, and empowers networks of domestic and international stakeholders. In this 
respect, our paper matches other papers in this volume in terms of global indicators’ social 
ramifications and ensuing political changes. The key differences, though, are to bring in the role 
of non-state actors and to highlight the theoretical and empirical implications of target 
heterogeneity and vulnerability producing divergent global indicators’ effects.  
We also chart a number of paths for future research. One is the adaptability of terrorist 
organizations. Our data did not measure shifting resources of terrorist organizations because it is 
difficult to track down transformations in funding types over the years for most groups. But how 
terrorists adapt and innovate to regulations and blacklisting should be examined more.93 Most 
importantly, the dynamics of blacklisting and how the target fully adapts to new regulatory 
environment was not fully explored in this chapter, as our focus was to show the link between 
terrorist groups’ funding dependency and the FTO blacklisting effect. Group vulnerabilities 
generate divergent consequences for non-state actors such as rebel groups, terrorist organizations 
or criminal gangs, regarding leadership targeting, government negotiations, and other 
interactions. A second point concerns how counter-terrorism policies cohere. We focused on the 
impact of blacklisting, but the combination of sanctions and military interventions, for instance, 
likely generates different effects on the attack capacity of terrorist organizations. Future research 
could examine the joint impact of various counterterrorism efforts.  
	  
																																								 																				
93 For example, al-Qaeda turned to kidnapping after a drop in donations (Braun 2011), which might have 
consequences for their attack patterns. Experts also note the adaptability of terrorist groups’ war economy 
and decreasing use of philanthropic organizations for funding (Lake 2016). This may hint at terrorist 
groups’ substitution strategy in response to FTO designation targeting private charities mainly.  
19 
	
References 
 
Asal, Victor, and R. Karl Rethemeyer. 2008. The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures 
and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks. Journal of Politics 70 (2): 437-449. 
 
Bacon, Tricia. 2018. Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Baker, Peter. 2017. White House Weighs Terrorist Designation for Muslim Brotherhood. New 
York Times. Feb 7, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/middleeast/muslim-
brotherhood-terrorism-trump.html?_r=0  
 
Bapat, Navin. 2011. Transnational Terrorism, US Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent. 
Journal of Peace Research 48 (3): 303-318 
 
Beck, Colin, and Emily Miner. 2013. Who Gets Designated a Terrorist and Why? Social Forces 
91(3) 837–872. 
 
Becker, Howard. 1997. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. Free Press. 
	
Bernburg, Jon Gunnar, Marvin Krohn, and Craig Rivera. 2006. Official Labeling, Criminal 
Embeddedness, and Subsequent Delinquency: A Longitudinal Test of Labeling Theory. Journal 
of Research in Crime and Delinquency 43(1): 67-88. 
 
Boutton, Andrew and David Carter 2014. Fair Weather Allies: Terrorism and the Allocation of 
United States Foreign Aid. Journal of Conflict Resolution 58(7): 1144-1173. 
 
Braun, Stephen. 2011. Al-Qaida Turns to Kidnappings as Donations Drop. NBC News. Available 
at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43457579/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/t/al-qaida-
turns-kidnappings-donations-drop/ Accessed on March 20, 2016. 
 
Burr, Millard, and Robert Collins. 2006. Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic 
World. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Byman, Daniel. 2005. Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press  
 
Cameron, Colin, and Prvain Trivedi. 2013. Regression Analysis of Count Data. Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Carter, David. 2012. A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups. International 
Organization 66(1):129–51.  
 
Chenoweth, Erica. 2013. Terrorism and Democracy. Annual Review of Political Science 16:355-
378. 
 
20 
	
Crenshaw, Martha and Gary LaFree. 2017. Countering Terrorism. Brookings Institution. 
 
Cronin, Audrey. 2012. Politics, Strategy, and the Haqqani Network. Small Wars Journal. 
September 6, 2012. http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/audrey-kurth-cronin  
 
Cronin, Audrey. 2011. Why the Haqqani Network is Not on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
List: The Politics of Naming and Shaming. Foreign Affairs. December 21, 2011. Available at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-12-21/why-haqqani-network-not-foreign-terrorist-
organizations-list Accessed on December 27, 2015. 
 
Cronin, Audrey. 2009. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of 
Terrorist Campaigns, Princeton University Press 
 
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2003. The “FTO List” and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RL32120. Available at 
http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32120.pdf Accessed on December 27, 2015. 
 
Cronin, Audrey Kurth, Huda Aden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones. 2004. Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RL32223. Available at 
https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf  Accessed on December 27, 2015. 
 
Curtis, Lisa. 2012. Combating the Haqqani Terrorist Network. Testimony before the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, United States 
House of Representatives. September 13, 2012. 
 
Dahlberg, Stefan, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Anna Khomenko & Richard Svensson. 2017. 
The Quality of Government Basic Dataset, version Jan17. University of Gothenburg: The 
Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/QoGBasJan17 
 
Decker, Eileen. 2014. The Enemies List: The Foreign Terrorist Organization List and Its Role in 
Defining Terrorism. Master’s Thesis in Security Studies (Homeland Defense and Security). 
Naval Postgraduate School. Available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=753810 Accessed on 
December 29, 2015. 
 
DeMeritt, Jacqueline. 2012. International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming 
and Shaming Save Lives? International Interactions 38 (5): 597-621. 
 
DeYoung, Karen. 2012. Haqqani Network to be Designated a Terrorist Group. Washington Post. 
September 7, 2012. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/haqqani-network-to-be-designated-a-terrorist-group-obama-officials-
say/2012/09/07/e6576ac0-f8f6-11e1-a073-78d05495927c_story.html  
Accessed on February 4, 2016. 
 
Early, Brian. 2015. Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail. Stanford 
University Press.  
 
Feldman, Philip. 1977. Criminal Behavior: A Psychological Analysis. John Wiley and Sons. 
21 
	
 
Finnström, Sverker. 2008. Living with Bad Surroundings: War, History, and Everyday Moments 
in Northern Uganda. Duke University Press.  
 
Financial Action Task Force. 2008. Terrorist Financing. FATF/OECD. 29 February 2008. 
 
Freedman, Benjamin. 2010. Officially Blacklisted Extremist/Terrorist (Support) Organizations: a 
Comparison of Lists from six countries and two International Organizations. Perspectives on 
Terrorism 4(2): 46-52.  
 
Gaibulloev, Khusrav and Todd Sandler. 2014. An Empirical Analysis of Alternative Ways that 
Terrorist Groups End. Public Choice 160(1-2): 25-44. 
 
Gaibulloev, Khusrav and Todd Sandler. 2013. Determinants of the Demise of Terrorist 
Organizations. Southern Economic Journal 79(4): 774-792. 
 
Gagalac, Ron. 2017. CPP-NPA is Still a Terrorist Group, US Says. ABS-CBN news. Feb 3, 2017. 
http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/02/02/17/cpp-npa-is-still-a-terrorist-group-us-says  
 
GAO. 2015. Combating Terrorism: Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation Process and U.S. 
Agency Enforcement Actions. United States Government Accountability Office. June 2015. 
GAO-15-629. Available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671028.pdf  
Accessed January 21, 2016. 
 
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., 2008. Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights 
Enforcement Problem. International Organization 62(4): 689-716. 
 
Head, Michael. 2016. Global Governance Implications of Terrorism: Using UN Resolutions to 
Justify Abuse of Basic Rights. In Mann, Scott. 2016. Transnational Governance: Emerging 
Models of Global Legal Regulation. Routledge. 179-212. 
 
Hess, Michel. 2007. Substantiating the Nexus between Diaspora Groups and the Financing of 
Terrorism. In Sean Costigan and David Gold (eds.) Terronomics. Ashgate. 49-63. 
 
Hoffman, Bruce.2006. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Hufbauer, Gary and Thomas Moll. 2007. Using Sanctions to Fight Terrorism. In Sean Costigan 
and David Gold (eds.) Terronomics. Ashgate. 179-194. 
 
Iacus, Stefano, Gary King, and Giuseppe Porro. 2012. Causal Inference Without Balance 
Checking: Coarsened Exact Matching. Political Analysis 20(1):1-24. 
 
International Crisis Group 2010. The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE. Crisis Group 
Asia Report N°186, 23 February 2010. 
 
22 
	
Jarvis, Lee, and Tim Legrand. 2018. The Proscription or Listing of Terrorist Organizations: 
Understanding, Assessment, and International Comparisons. Terrorism and Political Violence 
30(2): 199-215. 
 
Johnston, Patrick, Jacob Shapiro, Howard J. Shatz, Benjamin Bahney, Danielle F. Jung, Patrick 
Ryan, Jonathan Wallace 2016. Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and 
Terror in Iraq, 2005–2010. RAND Corporation. 
 
Jones, Seth, and Martin Libicki 2008. How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al 
Qaida. RAND Corporation. 
Karmon, Eli. 2005. Coalitions Between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, Nationalists, 
and Islamists. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. 
Krain, Matthew. 2012. J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of 
Genocides or Politicides? International Studies Quarterly 56(3): 574-589. 
 
Legrand, Tim. 2018. More Symbolic—More Political—Than Substantive: An Interview with 
James R. Clapper on the U.S. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Terrorism and 
Political Violence 356-372.  
 
Lake, Eli. US Stopped Blacklisting Domestic Terror Charities under Obama. Bloomberg, May 
12, 2016. https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-05-12/u-s-stopped-blacklisting-
domestic-terror-charities-under-obama 
 
Leuprecht, Christian, Olivier Walther, David B. Skillicorn, and Hillary Ryde-Collins. 2015. 
Hezbollah’s Global Tentacles: A Relational Approach to Convergence with Transnational 
Organised Crime. Terrorism and Political Violence. DOI:10.1080/09546553.2015.1089863  
 
Levitt, Matthew. 2004. Charitable Organizations and Terrorist Financing: A War on Terror 
Status-Check. Washington Institute for Near East Policy. March 19, 2004. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/charitable-organizations-and-terrorist-
financing-a-war-on-terror-status-che  
 
Levitt, Matthew. 2002. Designating the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. PolicyWatch 371. Washington 
Institute. March 25, 2002. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/designating-
the-al-aqsa-martyrs-brigades 
 
Li, Quan. 2005. Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents? Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 49(2):278-297. 
 
Link, Bruce, Francis Cullen, Elmer Struening, Patrick Shrout, and Bruce Dohernwend. 1989. A 
Modified Labeling Theory Approach to Mental Disorders: An Empirical Assessment. American 
Sociological Review 54(3): 400-423. 
 
23 
	
Lobe, Jim, and Jasmin Ramsey. 2012. U.S. to Take Iran Anti-Regime Group Off Terrorism List. 
Inter Press Service News Agency. Sept. 22. http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/09/u-s-to-take-iran-
anti-regime-group-off-terrorism-list/ 
 
Long, Scott, and Jeremy Freese. 2014. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables 
Using Stata. Stata Press. 
 
Mills, Kurt. 2015. International Responses to Mass Atrocities in Africa. Pennsylvania University 
Press. 
 
Modirzadeh, Naz, Dustin Lewis, and Claude Bruderlein. 2011. “Humanitarian Engagement 
under Counter-Terrorism: a Conflict of Norms and the Emerging Policy Landscape” 
International Review of the Red Cross. 93(883): 623-647. 
 
Murphy, Sean. 2003. United States Practice in International Law: Volume 1, 1999–2001. 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. 2009. Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) (CD-ROM). College Park, MD: University of Maryland. 
 
Paternoster, Raymond, and Ronet Bachman. 2012. “Labeling Theory.” In Richard Wright, Ed. 
Oxford Bibliographies in Criminology, Oxford University Press.  
	
Phillips, Brian J. 2014. Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity. International Studies 
Quarterly. 58(2):336-347. 
 
Phillips, Brian J. 2015. What is a Terrorist Group? Conceptual Issues and Empirical 
Implications. Terrorism and Political Violence 27 (2): 225-242. 
 
Phillips, Brian J.  2018. Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation, International Cooperation, 
and Terrorism. International Interactions DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1556158. 
 
Piazza, James A., and Scott Piazza. 2017. Crime Pays: Terrorist Group Engagement in Crime 
and Survival. Terrorism and Political Violence OnlineFirst. 
 
Radtke, Mitchell, and Hyeran Jo. 2018. Fighting the Hydra: United Nations Sanctions and Rebel 
Groups. Journal of Peace Research. 55(6): 759-773. 
 
Ranstorp, Magnus and Paul Wilkinson. 2013. Terrorism and Human Rights. Routledge. 
 
RAND. 2012. RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents. Accessed 3 August 2012. 
Available at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents.html 
 
Roberts, Adam. 2012. Democracy, Sovereignty and Terror. I.B.Tauris.  
 
Said, Wadie. 2015. Crimes of Terror: The Legal and Political Implications of Federal Terrorism 
Prosecutions. Oxford University Press  
24 
	
 
Salehyan, Idean, David Sirosky, and Reed Wood. 2014. Delegation and Civilian Abuse: A 
Principle-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities. International Organization. 68(3): 633-661. 
 
Shapiro, Jacob, Patrick Johnston, Howard J. Shatz, Benjamin Bahney, Danielle F. Jung, Patrick 
K. Ryan, and Jonathan Wallace. 2016. Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, 
and Terror in Iraq. RAND Corporation. 
 
Shapiro, Jacob. 2013. The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations. 
Princeton University Press. 
Shelley, Louise I. 2014. Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
State Department. 2014. Amendments to, and Maintenance of, the Terrorist Designations of 
Harakat ul-Mujahidin. Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington DC, August 7, 2014. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/230373.htm 
 
State Department, 1997. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Federal Register. 52650. Vol.62, No.195. Wednesday October 
8, 1997. 
 
Stern, Jessica and Amit Modi. 2008. Producing Terror: Organizational Dynamics of Survival. In 
Thomas Biersteker and Sue Eckert (eds.) Countering the Financing of Terrorism. Routledge. 
 
Treasury Department 2016. US Department of the Treasury. “Designated Charities and Potential 
Fundraising Front Organizations for FTOs” Protecting Charitable Organizations under Terrorism 
and Illicit Finance, Treasury Department Resource Center, Accessed at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/protecting-fto.aspx Last 
updated: 4/5/2016. 
 
Treasury Department. 2014. Terrorist Assets Report. Twenty-second Annual Report to the 
Congress on Assets in the United States Relating to Terrorist Countries and International 
Terrorism Program Designees. Office of Foreign Assets Control. U.S. Department of the 
Treasury. Available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/tar2013.pdf  
Accessed on January 21, 2016. 
 
Wellens, Karel. 2015. International Law in Silver Perspective: Challenges Ahead. Brill. 
 
Vittori, Jodi. 2011. Terrorist Financing and Resourcing. Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Zahid, Farhan. 2015. Islamist Charity Organizations: Avenues of Terrorism Financing in 
Pakistan. Foreign Analysis No.30. Centre Francais de Recherche sur le Renseignement.  
 
25 
	
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Statistical Analysis of Terrorist Attacks and FTO Designation 
 
 
Model 1 
No 
interactions 
Model 2 
Private 
funding 
Model 3 
State 
sponsor 
Model 4 
Terrorist 
networks 
Model 5 
Criminal 
activities 
FTO .425*** .791*** .409** .351** .461* 
 (.159) (.217) (.187) (.159) (.268) 
Private funding  .370**    
  (.151)    
FTO * Private funding  -.685***    
  (.233)    
State sponsor   .207   
   (.156)   
FTO * State sponsor   -.042   
   (.245)   
Terrorist network    .129  
    (.216)  
FTO * Terrorist network    .185  
    (.303)  
Criminal activities     .516*** 
     (.142) 
FTO * Criminal activities     -.229 
     (.274) 
Attacks (lag) .025*** .025*** .025*** .025*** .024*** 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Group size (log) .208*** .187*** .202*** .206*** .164*** 
 (.045) (.043) (.046) (.045) (.043) 
Religious group .264 .175 .275 .193 .361* 
 (.214) (.215) (.217) (.238) (.211) 
Regime type .026 .024 .029 .026 .017 
 (.029) (.029) (.029) (.030) (.031) 
GDP per capita (log) .017 -.042 .037 .009 .035 
 (.089) (.086) (.093) (.092) (.095) 
Population (log) -.066 -.086 -.051 -.061 -.105** 
 (.056) (.056) (.057) (.057) (.053) 
Year trend -.027*** -.028*** -.026*** -.027*** -.024*** 
 (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
N (groups) 4,758 4,758 4,758 4,758 4,758 
 (412) (412) (412) (412) (412) 
 
Note to Table 1: Dependent variable is the number of yearly terrorist attacks. Estimates are from 
zero-inflated negative binomial count models. Second stages of zero-inflated models are shown. 
Constants are not reported to save space. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by 
terrorist group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2. Listing vs. Sanctioning Effect 
Analysis of Pre and Post-9/11 Subsamples 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 pre 9/11 post 9/11 
   
FTO 0.433** 1.078*** 
 (0.181) (0.357) 
Private funding 0.367** 0.676** 
 (0.169) (0.304) 
FTO * Private funding  -0.397* -1.178** 
 (0.235) (0.457) 
Attacks (lag) 0.0224*** 0.0535*** 
 (0.00527) (0.0156) 
Group size (log) 0.189*** 0.114 
 (0.0477) (0.0707) 
Religious group -0.104 0.465 
 (0.268) (0.287) 
Regime type 0.0104 0.0435 
 (0.0325) (0.0521) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.0203 -0.232 
 (0.102) (0.143) 
Population (log) -0.0548 -0.118 
 (0.0697) (0.0860) 
Year trend -0.0174* 0.0106 
 (0.00907) (0.0435) 
N (groups) 3,349 
(315) 
1,219 
(256) 
 
Note to Table 2: Dependent variable is the number of yearly terrorist attacks. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, clustered by terrorist group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 1. Estimated Impact of FTO Status on Group Terrorist Attacks 
 
Note to Figure 1: Estimates from Model 5 in Table 1, with other variables at their means. 
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Figure 2. Terrorist Attacks and Funding Types  
Al-Qaeda, MeK, and FARC 
 
 
 
 
Note to Figure 2: Vertical red line indicates the year of FTO designation. Of the 
three groups, only MeK was dependent on private funding such as donations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
